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This article analyses the military and 
tactical training of the members of the 
Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union for guer-
rilla warfare in the interwar period. 
Small nations, such as Lithuania and 
other Baltic states, being unable to build 
up military strength in order to ensure 
national security, were forced to seek for 
unconventional methods of warfare, in-
cluding guerrilla strategies. The study 
places emphasis on the development of 
the guerrilla war concept in the Union 
periodicals. The author retraces a 
change in the intensity of the guerrilla 
warfare concept propagation amongst 
Lithuanian population and riflemen, in 
particular, through publications in the 
Trimitas — a periodical of the Lithua-
nian Riflemen’s Union. The author also 
identifies the narratives associated with 
the guerrilla matters employed for prop-
aganda purposes in order to create an 
image of a guerrilla as a defender of the 
Homeland — Lithuania. Additionally, 
the structure and numbers of the Union 
are analysed through a comparison with 
similar organisations of the other «small 
nations» of the Baltic North-East. The 
author addresses the issue of military 
missions planned by the Lithuanian Ar-
my, as well as the way riflemen imple-
mented them. Since the Union did not 
only offer military training, but was also 
engaged in the patriotic propaganda, the 
article focuses on the network of cultural 
institutions, homes of riflemen, orches-
tras, libraries, choirs, and athletic clubs 
used by the Union. The article sets out to 
establish whether the loss of Lithuanian 
sovereignty could have been possible 
without giving rise to a protracted guer-
rilla war. 
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Si vis pacem, para bellum1 — the famous phrase of the Roman histo-
rian Cornelius Nepos is relevant to any historical period. Military strate-
gists of different countries often ask the question as to what measures 
should be taken to ensure the victory in the eventual war. The most effi-
cient method is to avoid an armed conflict when achieving the goals for-
mulated by the government. In the countries, where the geopolitical doc-
trine is justified by the aspiration to safeguard sovereignty and territorial 
unity, the most adequate method of curbing external expansion threats is, 
of course, the tactic of military intimidation. The doctrine of military in-
timidation is the first choice of states that boast vast mobilisation, tactical 
and technical resources. However, as to small states, it is seldom the case. 
Naturally, it is sometimes possible to produce an intimidation effect 
through the synergy of military potential of individual states, but this alter-
native requires the establishment of intergovernmental military and de-
fence alliances. Moreover, the doctrine of military intimidation can rest on 
the concept of an “armed nation”, i. e. guerrilla warfare. 
The idea itself has been widely known for centuries. As the political phi-
losopher Carl Schmitt stressed, as early as in the first decades of the 19th cen-
tury, guerrillas fought with the first modern large-scale army — the forces of 
the first French Empire — in Spain and Russia and, to a lesser extent, in Aus-
tria. As we know, the tactics of a guerrilla war made it possible to achieve 
relatively positive results, and its elements are used up until today [3]. Accord-
ing to the historian Martin van Creveld, in case of an armed conflict between 
countries with different military powers, the defence tactics of the weaker par-
ty should rest on the natural obstacles of the fortification which will com-
pensate for the military superiority of the opponent. Another possibility is to 
avoid a decisive battle and use the tactics of ambushes, unexpected attacks, re-
treats, trying to seize a military initiative, since a showdown fight would result 
not in a victory, but a bloodbath. At the same time, the author emphasises that 
the weakness of a defending party becomes its strength, since a mere ability to 
survive is a prerequisite for a victory, whereas, for a strong party a war with a 
weak opponent means a defeat. The longer such a war lasts, the more opportu-
nities for a victory there are for the weak party, and the more likely it is that 
the strong party will suffer a defeat [2]. 
Hence it follows that one of the most rational decisions is to adopt the 
concepts of a “small war” and consistent introduction of guerrilla tactics el-
ements into the military training. This concept was harmonised with the 
military doctrine of the Lithuanian army in 1920—1930. This doctrine can 
be described as follows: Lithuania will be involved in a war in case of a 
large-scale conflict in Eastern Europe, its army will retreat and intern with 
the government in a friendly country. At the same time, riflemen will wage a 
guerrilla war in the occupied territory of Lithuania, waiting for the liberation 
of the country by victorious allies [1]. 
This article analyses the issue of security of Lithuania in the 1920s-30s, 
more precisely, the application of the guerrilla war concept. The study sets 
                                                     
1 If you wish for peace, prepare for war. 
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out to identify what structures of the Lithuanian forces prepared for guerrilla 
warfare and how they did it, since the question about the reason behind it — 
if one is aware of the geopolitical situation of the pre-war Lithuania [11] — 
does not require a further discussion. This article focuses on the question as 
to what consequences a guerrilla training brings about in case of an invasion. 
There are just a few historiographical works dedicated to the issue of de-
velopment of the guerrilla war strategy in Lithuania. They can be divided in-
to two groups. The first one brings together the works reviewing guerrilla 
actions of riflemen — members of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union (LRU) 
in the wars for the Lithuanian independence (1919—1920), during border 
clashes with the Polish forces in 1921—1923 which took place in the vicin-
ity of the neutral zone between Lithuania and Poland, especially during the 
seizure of the Wilno region — a territory also known as Central Lithuania 
(Pol. Litwa Środkowa) — by Polish troops [9; 12; 14; 24]. The second group 
is comprised by the works analysing the military functions of the LRU 
[8; 21; 22]. One must admit that the Lithuanian historiography lacks studies 
paying special attention to the issue of the influence exerted by the pre-war 
experience and possible scenarios of guerrilla tactics on the actions of the 
Lithuanian armed resistance of the 1940s. 
 
The Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union: structure and numbers 
 
The LRU was founded in 1919 to defend the civilian population from the 
plunder brought by the Workers and Peasants' Red Army, the Polish Army, 
the West Russian Volunteer Army, and individual looters. The RLU was 
formed on the basis of self-organised guerrilla units. During the war for the 
Lithuanian independence, the guerrilla movement involved approximately 
0.75 % of the Lithuanian population [8]. Until the liquidation of the LRU on 
July 11, 1940, the principal elements in the structure of the Union were in-
dependent platoons and companies, which acted autonomously bringing to-
gether LRU members from individual settlements, towns or — in case of big 
cities — factories, cooperatives, public institutions, and city quarters. Thus, 
the LRU was a territorial, network-based, and autonomous structure; the 
membership was voluntary and was encouraged by patriotism. An important 
feature of the Union was that it could maintain its viability even after the 
elimination of the headquarters and a formal liquidation of the organisation 
itself. The platoons and companies of the LRU, which brought together peo-
ple who lived nearby, knew each other well, or were even related by kinship, 
could communicate even if the territory was occupied by the enemy forces. 
The LRU followed the territorial principle; riflemen of each district 
comprised a unit (lit. rinktinė2), which was not a military or tactical, but 
merely an administrative entity. Thus, combat missions were carried out not 
by territorial units, but by independent platoons and companies of the LRU. 
In 1940, there were 22 such units, one of them — the 22nd territorial unit of 
                                                     
2 The word rinktinė is translated into English as team, but in this context it rather 
means territorial unit. 
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railway employees was active across the country. Territorial formations in-
cluded approximately 1200 platoons; in cities, they were sometimes united 
into companies. Thus, the number of individual units was smaller — 872. 
Rural and small town residents accounted for approximately 70 % of the 
LRU [12]; thus, platoons were often located at considerable distances and 
were not large in numbers. 
Of course, the scope of resistance could depend on the numbers of the 
LRU, but there are two additional aspects to consider. The first one is the 
number of military trained people who could fight and train new recruits of 
guerrilla units. The second one is the support for combatants provided by local 
residents which was of great importance for the success and protraction of re-
sistance. There is no doubt that the support of local residents plays a decisive 
role in the success of guerrilla warfare. It is a priori clear that the more mem-
bers of the RLU there are, the more support it will receive from the society 
due to strong social ties, sometimes even without sharing their beliefs. The 
family circle of each rifleman — in the pre-war Lithuania a family consisted 
of 4.7 people [23] — included parents, brothers, sisters, and other relatives. 
Theoretically, it is possible to suppose that a small part of the country’s popu-
lation, which was involved in the LRU, could enjoy the support of the major-
ity of Lithuanians; 2.79 % of LRU members (table 1) through family3 and 
mostly through other social connections could draw into the organisation ap-
proximately 1/8th of the population of the pre-war Lithuania. 
 
Table 1 
 
Trends of the LRU numbers in 1919—1940 
 
Year Number of units 
Combat-
ant 
Non-com-
batant Total 
Population, 
mln people 
The share of LRU 
members, % 
1919 39 — — 800 ~ 2 0.04 
1921 — 5224 3160 8384 ~ 2 0.42 
1922 — 4628 4070 8698 ~ 2 0.43 
1923 — — — 10 546 2.14 0.49 
1924 321 9757 4490 14 247 2.176 0.65 
1925 370 11 748 5568 17 316 2.204 0.79 
1926 436 11 313 6955 18 268 2.228 0.82 
1934 — 28 478 — — 2.476 — 
1935 — 24 976 8300 33 276 2.5 1.33 
1940 872** 48 107 20 000 68 107 2.443* 2.79 
 
* Including the Wilno region — 2.925 mln people. 
** Historiography suggests that in 1940 the LRU consisted of 1200 platoons. 
 
Sources: [8, p. 55—56; 23, p. 126; LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 560, l. 66.; LCVA, 
f. 929, ap. 5, b. 408, l. 1.; Kardas, 1937, N 13, p. 315]. 
                                                     
3 Of course, it is only a theoretical speculation, since some riflemen belonged to the 
same families. 
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Of course, these data cannot answer the question as to how much the 
contingent of the LRU could extend. This answer requires an analysis of the 
data obtained in Lithuania and other similar states of the Baltic region — 
Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. I will compare the data on paramilitary organi-
sations active in these countries in 1939—1940 according to three parame-
ters: 1) absolute numbers; 2) the share of the organisation members in the 
population; 3) the density of combatant members in the country’s territory. 
Firstly, we will find out what military potential (personnel) the organisations 
of the north-western part of the Baltic region, which were quite similar and 
gravitated to the guerrilla movement, had. Secondly, we can answer the 
question as to how large was the organisation’s support among the popula-
tion. Thirdly, we will acquire a better understanding of the density of guer-
rilla units that could be mobilised in case of a war. 
A comparative analysis shows that Finnish paramilitary organisations 
were the largest in terms of numbers, followed by the organisations of the 
smallest of the countries in question — Estonia, whereas Lithuania ranks 
third (table 2). But having compared the density of combatant members (i. e. 
the number of potential guerrilla combatants), one can see that Lithuanian 
and Estonian contingents are two-three times as large as those of the other 
countries. It means that the number of combatant members of the LRU was 
sufficient to wage intensive guerrilla warfare across the territory of Lithua-
nia, which would also make it possible to exert at least a limited control over 
the territory and the population. According to the calculations, the optimum 
number of combatants for guerrilla defence in Lithuania was 30—50 thou-
sand people4, i. e. approximately 0.5—0.8 guerrillas per 1 km² of the coun-
try’s territory [4], thus, 48 107 combatant riflemen would be enough to com-
prise a rather dense guerrilla movement network in 1940. 
 
Table 2 
 
The numbers of paramilitary organisations in 1939—1940 
 
Country Population, mln people 
Territory, 
km² 
Combatant 
members, 
people 
Share in the 
population, 
% 
Density  
of combatant  
members, people/km2 
Lithuania 2.443 52 822* 48 107 1.97 0.91 
Latvia 1.995 65 791 31 874 1.6 0.48 
Estonia 1.134 47 549 42 673 3.76 0.9 
Finland 3.7 383 150 119 500 3.23 0.31 
Total 9.272 549 312 242 154 2.61 — 
Average 0.44 
 
* in 1923—1939, the Lithuanian territory, including the Klaipeda region, 
(2848 km²) was 55 670 km²; since the end of 1939, including the Vilnius region 
(6909 km²), and excluding the Klaipeda one, it was 59 731 km². 
 
Sources: [8, p. 58]; Pētersons, A. 2007, Krustugunīs : latviešu karotmāka 1940—1945 : 
60 gadus no tautas slēptais, Riga, p. 114—115.; Raukas, A. (ed.). 2008, Estonija : encik-
                                                     
4 The calculations were performed in the 1990s for the territory of the post-war 
Lithuania — 65 300 km². 
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lopedicheskij spravochnik [Estonia: An Encyclopaedic Reference], Tallin, p. 54.; Jo-
wett, P. 2006, Snodgrass B. Finland at War 1939—45, Oxford, p. 18; 25—27; 29. 
 
It is worth noting that approximately one half of combatant riflemen 
were reservists, and, in case of mobilisation, would be commissioned into 
regular forces of the Lithuanian Army, which, in 1940, consisted of 125—
150 thousand soldiers divided into five infantry divisions and other cavalry 
and artillery units [1]. At the end of 1934, 28 478 combatant riflemen, 
among whom 344 were reservist officers, 10 697 first class reservists 
(37.56 %), other riflemen (17 781 people), who were armed with 7438 rifles 
and 20 light machine guns [25, l. 1], did not only have to stay within their 
units and ensure the security of the army’s rear, but also had to wage guer-
rilla warfare in the occupied territory. Almost six years later, in 1940, the 
number of the first class reservists among the riflemen increased to 19067 or 
39.63 % of the total contingent of combatant riflemen; i. e. it changed only 
by two percentage points in comparison to 1934. At the time, the LRU had 
27 478 rifles, 3160 handguns, and 378 light machine guns [8]. Such an 
amount of small arms was enough for the rest of 29 040 combatant riflemen. 
Moreover, since the LRU was supplied with weapons by the army, 
which had a surplus of rifles and light machine guns in 19405 [6, l. 11], in 
case of necessity riflemen could urgently receive extra weapons from the 
army’s supplies. It is worth adding that the LRU units located in vicinity of 
the borders were equipped better and earlier. 
An important factor affecting the collaboration between the Lithuanian 
society and the LRU was a large scale of the organisation’s activities, which 
were not limited to military training only. Over two decades of its function-
ing in Lithuania, the LRU created a network of cultural institutions: in 1939, 
72 homes of riflemen, 125 choirs, 417 amateur theatre companies, 105 or-
chestras, and 350 libraries were operating in Lithuania. There were also a 
large number of sports teams and different courses. The LRU also included a 
large network of fire brigades; for example, in 1939, there were 4352 rifle-
men in 175 fire-fighting brigades [12]. It is worth noting that, in the pre-war 
Lithuania, especially in the province, social and cultural life was closely 
connected to the LRU and the riflemen’s initiatives. 
 
The promotion of the guerrilla warfare concept  
in the LRU’s Trimitas newspaper 
 
Over 20 years — from 1920 until 1940 — the LRU published a weekly 
newspaper entitled the Trimitas; in 1939, 25,000 copies were issued week-
ly, which made it a rather popular newspaper in comparison to other peri-
                                                     
5 The Lithuanian army had 137 500 7.92 mm calibre rifles (and 96.6 mln cartridges), 
whereas it required only 100 825. Moreover, there were 10 thousand other calibre 
rifles with 1.9 mln cartridges; 3755 7.92 mm calibre light machine guns, whereas 
only 2558 units were required. 
International history 
 38
odicals of the pre-war Lithuania. The newspaper publication made it possi-
ble not only to promote patriotic ideas, but also to ingrain the guerrilla war 
concept in the minds of the riflemen. There are data suggesting that not 
less than 75 % of riflemen in each platoon had a subscription to the Trimi-
tas [20]. 
In 1924—1940, 852 issues of the weekly newspaper were published. 
An analysis of the available 766 issues (89.9 %) makes it possible to state 
that the notions relating to guerrillas and a guerrilla war are used in differ-
ent contexts in 416 issues (54.3 %), which shows that this topic is “out-
stripped” only by two other subjects — the problem of the Vilnius and 
Klaipeda regions. One can identify several key topics discussed in the 
newspaper: the history of guerrilla actions in Lithuania in 1918—1923; 
propaganda, agitation and tactical recommendations aimed at the prepara-
tion for an imminent war; guerrilla training of riflemen; pages of Lithua-
nian history. Moreover, the newspaper published some information about 
successful guerrilla warfare in other countries, namely, in China against 
Japan, Ethiopia against Italy, and others. It is indicative that these texts 
presented guerrillas as heroes, defenders of their motherland. It did not on-
ly shape the image of guerrillas in different countries (of course, excluding 
Poland), but also developed the attitude that, despite greater numbers of the 
enemy force, guerrilla warfare can be successful. 
A General Staff Colonel, Stasys Raštikis, the future commander of 
the Lithuanian Army, in 1933 published an article, which was 
consistent with the general tone of the newspaper and that stated that 
each rifleman should be not only a patriot, but also a person always 
ready to wage guerrilla warfare (even acting on his own). This idea, as 
S. Raštikis maintained, was supposed to be explained to riflemen in a 
language that everyone could understand [20, 1933, № 5, p. 85]. In 
1937, the Lithuanian Minister of Defence, Brigadier General Stasys 
Dirmantas, said at a LRU meeting, “study military disciplines with zeal, 
especially the practical aspects of guerrilla warfare” [20, 1937, № 10, 
p. 220]. The concept of a guerrilla war was also supported by the LRU 
commander, Colonel Pranas Saladžius, who emphasised that guerrillas 
could hold for a long time in an occupied territory, since they rely not 
on assailable military bases, but on their home farms, families, and pa-
triotism [20, 1937, № 25, p. 581]. 
An analysis of the Trimitas articles (see fig.) shows that the inten-
sity of exploiting the guerrilla topic increased for the first time in 1929. 
It did not lose popularity over the following years; however, the chart 
shows a downward trend. Nevertheless, since 1934, the number of is-
sues mentioning guerrillas or guerrilla warfare suddenly doubled and 
was increasing until 1939. The first increase probably relates to certain 
attempts to encourage a conflict with Poland, whereas the mid-1930 
growth seems to stem from the deteriorating international climate in the 
region and S. Raštikis's ascendancy to the position of the commander of 
the Lithuanian Army. 
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Fig. The percentage of Trimitas issues (1924—1940)  
covering the topic of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare, % 
 
Military plans and training 
 
As early as in 1924, i. e. a year after the demobilisation of the Lithuanian 
Army, the local press published an appeal to form in case of a war guerrilla 
units consisting of 60 combatants. They were expected to act independently, 
hiding in the woods during the day, avoiding open hostilities, and setting 
ambushes at night [20, 1924, № 192, p. 19]. There was even a suggestion 
that, in case of a war, all able-bodied men had to get to the woods and form 
guerrilla units. In rural areas, which were home to 4/5 of the Lithuanian pop-
ulation at the time, the remaining women and children had to provide for 
themselves, not unlike the guerrilla units consisting of 40—60 men, who had 
to supply themselves with provisions, arms, and ammunition through acting 
drastically and robbing the enemy’s transports and warehouses. It would be 
difficult for the enemy to locate such small groups in the occupied unfamil-
iar territory [20, 1924, № 195, p. 16]. 
In 1926, the chief of the Lithuanian Army’s headquarters, General Staff 
Colonel Kazys Škirpa, planned that, in case of a war, it would be necessary 
to organise large-scale guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear and thus sup-
port regular troops [21]. The head of the LRU agreed that such actions on 
the side of the riflemen are possible, but added that the guerrilla units 
would require officers and NCOs [13, l. 14]. Riflemen were trained to form 
guerrilla units; as early as in the 1920s, the idea of an “armed nation” was 
not strange to them [20, 1926, № 40, p. 1275]. The Lithuanian Ministry of 
Defence believed that the LRU structure is important for the country’s de-
fence system not only as an instrument of fuelling patriotism among citi-
zens, but also as a military unit. Riflemen were supposed to be prepared to 
defend the borders in case of a war and secure the mobilisation and con-
centration of regular troops. It was believed that riflemen would not re-
place regular troops, but would be able to fight against the enemy and thus 
support the army. Riflemen were also to be used in the rear services. Guer-
rilla riflemen were supposed to operate in small groups or individually in a 
familiar territory, to have a decent knowledge of cartography, and to be ex-
International history 
 40
cellent snipers [20, 1926, № 37, p. 1180, 1192]. In view of the above crite-
rion, in 1926, the LRU published a collection of lectures on guerrilla war-
fare [14, p. 110]. 
Of course, the Lithuanian top officers did not only develop theoretical 
concepts, but also made meticulous preparations. In 1926—1936, 2852 se-
cond lieutenants graduated from the military college specialising in train-
ing reserve officers [7, p. 354]. This college also paid a significant at-
tention to guerrilla tactics training, since the Lithuanian borders were of 
significant length to eventual enemies, the army was small, and consider-
able parts of the border had to be defended through guerrilla attacks carried 
out by small units. This was the focus of training of future officers 
[10, 1930, № 11, p. 166]. 
In 1928, during autumn manoeuvres in the Kėdainiai district, local 
riflemen commanded by a retired officer, imitated the formation of a 
guerrilla unit and "seized" the headquartes of the cavalry regiment that 
played the part of the enemy — the Polish army [20, 1928, № 39, p. 1267]. 
In a similar way, guerrilla attacks were enacted in the course of manoeu-
vres with the participation of several riflemen platoons from the neighbour-
ing districts. Such manoeuvres were performed on October 20, 1929 in the 
Marijampolė district [20, 1929, № 45, p. 754]. Similar field training exer-
cises were organised in the next few years [20, 1930, № 16, p. 318; 1935, 
№ 6, p. 108; № 10, p. 182; № 14, p. 256; 1939, № 18, p. 430; № 45, 
p. 1102]; regular army units also took part in them [20, 
1936, № 11, p. 260]. Guerrilla riflemen learned in practice the tactics of 
seizing different settlements. During the manoeuvres performed on No-
vember 11, 1934 in the Panevėžys district, the guerrillas “took” the town of 
Smilgiai [20, 1934, № 47, p. 914]. Guerrilla manoeuvres were also per-
formed at night, which was extremely important [20, 1934, № 40, p. 800]. 
In 1937 and 1938, riflemen participated as guerrillas in the large-scale au-
tumn manoeuvres of the Lithuanian Army [8, p. 56]. 
Every year, new members joined the LRU, and they had to be trained not 
only practically but also theoretically. For example, in 1934 70 % of combat-
ant riflemen took part in manoeuvres, 75 % participated in firearms training. 
In the same year, 4097 new members joined the LRU; all of them underwent 
military training and passed a test [20, 1935, № 7, p. 116]. Riflemen were 
also given theoretical lectures on guerrilla tactics [20, 1939, № 19, p. 453; 
1940, № 14, p. 342], as well as such lectures as “Guerrilla warfare, disci-
pline, and propaganda” [20, 1935, № 33, p. 599] which were necessary and 
yielded positive results. 
It was clearly understood that the key to successful guerrilla warfare was 
the terrain. Forests (especially, coniferous), shrubbery, swamps, and hills 
were perfect for guerrilla warfare and could help escape the enemy’s avia-
tion, motorised or tank units, and artillery bombardment [20, 1939, 
№ 28, p. 684]. Another important condition affecting the success of guerrilla 
warfare was the support of the local population without which a guerrilla 
war would be next to impossible [20, 1940, № 24, p. 585]. However, there 
was a clear understanding that in the given situation only guerrilla but not 
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trench warfare was feasible. There was a need for each citizen to understand 
the nuances and importance of guerrilla warfare. Each village, forest, and 
valley had to be capable of being turned into a “stronghold” [15, p. 191]. The 
prospect that in the future all Lithuanians would have to sustain a guerrilla 
war and provide for the combatants was not strange to the society. More-
over, there was a general understanding that combatants had to wear a uni-
form. Thus, in the eyes of the enemy they would look like an opponent that 
had to be treated according to the rules of an international humanitarian law 
[10, 1939, № 19, p. 489]. 
In 1935, a special law was adopted; in 1936, the LRU passed a statute 
which stipulated that riflemen not only could but also had to take an active 
part in organising military training, since, in the imminent war, they will be 
engaged in guerrilla warfare [20, 1936, № 31, p. 730]. The military com-
manders of riflemen platoons were appointed by the army headquarters; ri-
flemen wore the same uniform as soldiers of the regular army. A clear chain 
of command, discipline and military training were identified as key priorities 
of the LRU [17, p. 399—406]. In the 1940s, there were 872 commanders 
of rifleman units in the ranks of the LRU, 404 of them were reserve offi-
cers, and 192 were former NCOs. So, more than 2/3 of the LRU command 
staff had undergone military training in the Lithuanian army. Moreover, 
many LRU members were police and border force officers and teachers [8, 
p. 55—56]. 
A 1938 instruction of the ŠADIR army headquarters specified that, in 
case of military actions, a part of riflemen had to stay in the enemy’s rear 
and wage guerrilla warfare [19, l. 12]. In 1940, the headquarters also fol-
lowed this scheme. Guerrillas had to act in a familiar territory (woods and 
swamps), in small groups or individually, being armed with light weapons. 
These instructions were repeated in the statutes of the Lithuanian infantry 
and cavalry. Special guidelines were published for riflemen — Guerrilla tac-
tics and The features of riflemen’s tactics [8, p. 58—61]. In case of an unex-
pected attack, the LRU members had to act on their own without further in-
structions from the central authorities [18, l. 31]. 
In the last days of peace in Europe, one of the Lithuanian military theo-
rists of the time, a university military instructor, General Staff Major Vytau-
tas Bulvičius described in his book the general attitude of the Lithuanian ar-
my to imminent warfare. Alongside the use of military potential of aviation 
and tanks, the author emphasised the importance of guerrilla movement, ana-
lysed warfare in the conditions of Lithuania, and identified those responsible 
for waging guerrilla warfare in case of an invasion. Of course, it was the ri-
flemen [5, p. 97, 145]. One of the last instructions the LRU members re-
ceived from the army headquarters is dated April 1940: the directive on the 
use of LRU forces in case of a war stressed that on the termination of war-
fare in the West, Germany could attack Lithuania, in this case riflemen were 
supposed to secure mobilisation; when retreating, they were supposed to de-
stroy the infrastructure and defend crucial objects in the rear. Each rifleman 
left in the enemy’s rear had to wage guerrilla warfare [16, l. 44]. Thus, the 
Union was given the task of popularising the riflemen movement under the 
International history 
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slogan “Sušaulinti Lietuvą”6, which called upon large masses to join the Un-
ion and move closer to the ideal of an armed and patriotic nation [20, 
1933, № 16, p. 302]. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The experience of guerrilla warfare gained in the wars for the Lithuanian 
independence was not forgotten in the pre-war period. The concept of a 
guerrilla war was widely exploited in the public discourse through the press. 
The Lithuanian Army developed military plans, which gave riflemen unam-
biguous instructions on guerrilla warfare. The principal structure that pre-
pared the general population for guerrilla warfare was the LRU. However, 
since 1935 the LRU was subordinate to the army’s supreme commander, one 
can state that there was a combatant structure preparing for a guerrilla war in 
Lithuania, which is important from the perspective of an international hu-
manitarian law. 
An active promotion of the guerrilla warfare concept in the Trimitas 
newspaper and preparation of riflemen for such actions in the pre-war years 
was carried out on a regular basis; however, one can identify peaks of such 
activities. One of them related to the 1929 Lithuanian-Polish conflict at the 
League of Nations, another (1934—1940) reflected the changes not only in 
the command of the Lithuanian army or its re-equipment, but also a change 
to the general military doctrine, which had included Germany in the ranks of 
“enemies”. It points to the fact that the high command of the Lithuanian Ar-
my responded to increasing military threats with an active preparation of the 
LRU for guerrilla warfare. 
The semi-independent LRU structure ensured that, in case of an invasion 
riflemen could — and, according to the pre-war plans, were supposed to — 
wage guerrilla warfare without distorting its internal military structure. It 
means that in the 1920s-1930s, the general assumption was that, in the fu-
ture, any aggressive territorial aspirations of the neighbouring countries 
could be contained only through protracted guerrilla warfare. Of course, in 
the pre-war years, all these measures were aimed against the eventual Polish 
and — since the 1930s — German aggression, i. e. against the countries, on 
which Lithuania did not, in effect, wage a war. 
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